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Gorbachev was entirely responsible for the collapse of the GDR. To what extent is this accurate?

 

 

The unanticipated demise of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the latter stages of the 1980s, has both engendered a compelling history, and led to an immediate questioning of its origins. The precise matter of accountability, as revealed in the statement, has also been the subject of immense and continuing controversy. To make a preliminary distinction, I would contend that one could not justifiably attribute a happening as massive as the collapse of a regime, to any one man, or indeed to any one cause. It was the interrelating dynamic of events, which has confounded historians and contemporaries alike, and contributed to the complex narrative that is the dialogue of history. Therefore, one must approach the question by evaluating the relative internal and external factors in terms of which was the most influential in bringing about the collapse of the USSR. One must also prioritise within these, and specifically respond to the questioning of Gorbachev’s role. I intend to mark November 9^th 1989, the date of the fall of the Berlin wall, as the pivotal point at which East German communism essentially collapsed. Aside from being hugely symbolic of the ending of Communism and the Cold War, when the wall was breeched, and the physical movement of people across the border happened, the collapse of the GDR became extremely likely, if not inevitable.

Essentially, the internal flaws of the GDR’s economy, government and society prove insuperable by the end of the 1980s, especially under the pressure of accumulated discontent, precipitated by external developments, especially those from the East.

One must principally analyse Gorbachev’s role, and consider the impact of his policies in shaping events in the GDR. His establishment of Glasnost (openness) and Perestroika (reconstruction) released uncontrollable, pent-up revolutionary forces, which ‘shook the foundations of the internal order’[1]. Glasnost especially encouraged thought, and thus not only fostered the desire for change and human rights, but also ‘triggered a new political discourse in East Germany’[2]. GDR citizens were used to following the USSR unequivocally, and therefore began to crave, expect and demand the same privileges, freedoms and reforms. Thus when the USSR held its first democratic elections on 26^th March 1989, it was only a matter of time before the rest of the East would want to follow suit. ‘Gorbachev’s political reforms in the Soviet Union sowed discontent among the East German people, as they cast doubt on the Soviet commitment to guarantee the existence of the East German regime.’[3] USSR became a beacon of hope and Gorbachev a huge icon, whose presence further eroded support for Honecker, and further undermined the regime. Citizen protest had occurred before across Eastern Europe, but what partly facilitated the collapse of the GDR, was Gorbachev’s transformation of the USSR’s position. Gorbachev’s policy changes initiated what other external events, such as opposition movements in Eastern Europe had failed to do.

The proposition that ‘Gorbachev was entirely responsible for the collapse of the GDR’, is misleading as it suggests it was done purposefully. One can relate this to developments in the USSR, where in fact Gorbachev sought to heal Communism, not get rid of it. That the problems proved irreparable and the collapse of Communism, almost inevitable was due to the fact that after he had opened the USSR up, it was impossible to satisfy Communists and reformers. Consequently, the fall of Communism in the USSR as in the GDR and the rest of Eastern Europe, can be blamed on Gorbachev’s ‘middle-way’, as he failed either to continue the repression that would secure its complete continuation, or to sufficiently reform to obtain voluntary compliance. Force was the only option to secure the continuation of communism, but he would not resort to this.

The economic problems of the USSR can also be held partly responsible, as it could no longer afford to maintain its satellite states, or the even Cold War. The military and defence spending was simply unsustainable, and Gorbachev was left with no choice but to release its financially burdening buffer zone, or risk ruin. In March 1989, communism collapsed as Gorbachev’s ‘Sinatra Doctrine’ announced that Eastern Europe would no longer be held together by the Soviets, and a new tone was set across the East. This meant that the GDR lost its political support and military might, and quickly found that it couldn’t stand on its own two feet! Whilst the GDR had the backing of the USSR, there was no possibility for opposition, but when Gorbachev made the decisive move away, he inadvertently provoked underlying problems of legitimacy and economics, and opposition that could not be dealt with. Indeed, ‘once Soviet leaders made it clear they would not intervene, these regimes collapsed.’[4] Hence the triggering causes of the collapse were those stemming from Gorbachev.

Expanding from the influence of Gorbachev, the relative significance of other external factors must be taken into account, particularly as East-West relations improved, and all over Eastern Europe, just like the GDR, the reality of Soviet Communism was becoming too much.

Another challenge to the claim that ‘Gorbachev was entirely responsible for the collapse of the GDR’ can be made in reference to the Western allies role in inducing the collapse. True, propaganda and prosperity in the West created unease in East, and moreover, the west gave the GDR credit that worsened economic situation. Additionally rapprochement between the GDR and the GFR did show a gradual but significant movement towards peace, and thus hindered the hostile relations, which had kept the division of Germany in place. However, I would deny the West’s ‘responsibility’ in applying pressure for change, indicated as, ‘The question of reunification figured well down the list of political issues which West Germans identified as urgent or important’[5].

The fact that in the late 1980s, the Cold War was coming to a close ended the general necessity for a divided Europe, and specifically a divided Germany. Division of Europe only remained as long as the US and the USSR remained at loggerheads with each other and embroiled in the conflict. Gorbachev’s moves to end the Cold War meant moves to end the division too. Was this fact recognised by many, e.g. citizen movements, and this partly caused the collapse? Glaessner emphasises external influences in arguing that ‘the people of the GDR owe their freedom in large part to the national movements in Eastern Europe. Without the radical change in Poland and Hungary and without Soviet acceptance that such change could not be arrested by force, there would have been no revolution.’[6] Thus the bursts for freedom, and the emergence of Polish solidarity are said to greatly influence events in the GDR, in providing an example of a strong and unyielding opposition. In this juncture, though the 1968 Prague Spring involving Dubček’s attempt to establish ‘socialism with a human face’ in Czechoslovakia was crushed, it could still act as a vital precursor for events in the GDR.

To again fit the GDR into the broader spectrum for change across Eastern Europe, one can discern that the Age of Communists was dying out, and ‘those who ran the Soviet satellite regimes had lost their faith in their own systems, or had never had it.’[7] On 2^nd May 1989, the barbed wire and divides between Hungary and Austria were beginning to be broken down. In this context, the GDR has been seen as merely part of a process of disintegration in the Eastern block, its reasons for collapse being altogether reliant on external factors, including, though not limited to, Gorbachev.

Elizabeth Pond makes the contention that ‘It was not the case, as it is popularly assumed, that changes were ordered either by Big Brother Gorbachev, or by Big Brother West Germany.’[8] I would be inclined to support this, and state that external events only really provided the catalyst for change. A notable example of this extends to ‘…the changes in Hungary which were to prove the proximate cause of the East German revolution’[9], as the opening of its border triggered further mass emigration, which East Germany’s weak economy and failing leadership could not overcome.

I would thus dispute the accuracy of the view that ‘Gorbachev was entirely responsible for the collapse of the GDR’, and instead underline the significance of underlying, internal factors in providing the necessary preconditions for revolutionary change.

In this context, Maier highlights the economic and political reasoning behind the end of the GDR, and consequently negates the opinion that Gorbachev is exclusively accountable, as ‘For the first time East Germany had an obvious economic crisis it could no longer deny.’[10] Long-term economic problems, dating to post-war devastation, worsened by reparations, and Ulbricht’s plans for economic reform, which ‘strained the economy to breaking point’,[11] are central to this analysis, as ‘There was a failure to develop an adequate long-term plan.’[12] During the 1970s and 1980s, East European communist states were suffering economic failures and eventually bankruptcy. Such economic inferiority and massive debt weakened the central power of the USSR, and made people look to alternatives to the collapsing Communist system. A lack of raw materials, which forced reliance on imports, meant a distinct vulnerability to changes and problems in the world market. The 1973 oil crisis, though apparently beneficial to the USSR as a large oil producer, actually proved destructive, ‘postponing the need for economic reform’[13], and thus compounding problems for Gorbachev. This shows why the economic system, and Communism throughout Eastern Europe did not collapse until 1989. This fragile situation worsened in the 1980s by the shift in attention towards technological means of production, for instance the chemical industry and computers, areas in which the GDR was extremely backwards. Also, by this time, the GDR was in even greater foreign debt as Honecker’s ‘unity of economic and social policy’ failed, productivity was too low, and plans for rapid modernisation were unreachable. By October 1989, the GDR ‘had accumulated a foreign debt of 49 billion “valuta marks” ($26.5 billion)’[14]. Economic and industrial progress degenerated drastically when the USSR withdrew, as the GDR had relied so heavily upon it. Trade competition from Asia and financing defence and army also expensive, and induced debts, loans and much discontent, showing how ‘…political turmoil had many of its roots in economic dissatisfaction’[15].

Fulbrook attributed the GDR’s course to ‘the political realities, rather than the constitutional provisions’[16]. In doing so, another creditable challenge to the accuracy of the view that ‘Gorbachev was entirely responsible for the collapse of the GDR’ is posed. Principally, the leadership’s failure to react to the circumstances can be blamed for the collapse, as they were aging, stubborn and increasingly incapable, harbouring outdated visions of a socialist regime. Many who perceived this as a sign of selfish dictators consumed with infighting, and refusing to pass on power resented them. The fact that the leaders isolated themselves in rumoured luxury in Wandlitz, also generated hostility at the leadership of the GDR, and by association towards the entire fabric of the East German Communist state. The SED flatly refused reforms, ignoring both domestic protest and economic instability, and developments east of the GDR. On May 7^th 1989, another anger-provoking blunder by the SED took place as they falsified the election results, leading to an increased rate of demonstrations etc. Even more responsibility for the collapse of the GDR can thus be attributed to the SED in light of the demonstration of the 7^th October 1989, which they ignored, and continued the military show commemorating the 40^th anniversary of the GDR. The SED was guilty of misjudged responses as well, using violence against peaceful demonstrations. A foremost example of this was the September 1987 mass march for freedom, the first allowed in East Germany. Instead of contemplating the blatant warning signs, the SED fatefully attempted to backtrack and repress opposition, and in the process only fortified resistance. Throughout 1989, demonstrations (e.g. 13^th February, Dresden for human rights, and regular protests in Leipzig) were oppressed and Honecker even spoke of the longevity of the Berlin Wall. Krenz, his successor, proved just as unpopular, and equally unable to deal with the snowballing opposition movements. The executive was too far removed from the situation all along, by the time they reacted by visiting Leipzig on 13^th October, it was too late. Other practical issues of crime and corruption also signalled the failings of communism.

As Maier identifies, ‘East Germany’s claim to statehood was always in question’[17], in other words its existence was constantly undermined by its lack legitimacy, which prevented its long-term viability and workability. The regime consisted also of certain inherent contradictions, which had a destabilising effect, particularly the fact that there was societal equality without the political equivalent to complement it. Amongst the GDR’s shortcomings was its failure to establish a separate national identity, and this is pertinent in the context of the collapse of the GDR. Certain events in the latter stages of the 1980s highlighted the common German identity, and thus undermined the foundation of the GDR with the anniversary of Martin Luther in 1983, and the 750^th anniversary of Berlin in 1987.

Another fundamental problem was that the GDR was ‘based more on repression than success’[18] and consequently Communism’s control was too ‘superficial’[19]. ‘The political and economic systems in the GDR – and elsewhere in the Eastern bloc – collapsed because of their own structural deficiencies, a process that was accelerated when the Soviet Union removed its protective shield.’[20] This exposes how internal instability is eventually brought to light. Between 1953 and 1989 there was the overriding feeling that one should accept the regime and make the best out of it and thus the population was subdued and neutralised, it seems, rather than being converted into active promotion of the regime. The Stasi was too harsh, and with the establishment of the KVP and the NVA, society took on an increasingly militaristic edge. ‘One noticeable trend in the Honecker period was the growing numbers of military, police and state security’[21], and since this coincided with a growth in opposition, one naturally draws parallels between them. Political repression was very significant as people lacked basic freedoms (e.g. movement / speech etc), had no right to strike, and no forum for their grievances in the undemocratic and unrepresentative regime. Even the Trade Union, FDGB, was controlled by the SED. Clearly the GDR had not managed to procure either complete conformity, or a successful removal of the opposition, and this must partly explain what became of the GDR. Such a situation was bound to backfire eventually, and it did in 1989. Totalitarian control was too high-risk and high-maintenance, and influence and stability hard to establish if repression was lessened. Conformity, amongst other things, indeed bred dissent. Thus despotism was paradoxically a reason why the regime survived for so long, and also why it fell. No ‘middle-ground’ as adopted by Gorbachev was possible with a dictatorship. The only serious opposition was repressed in June 1953, but this was nonetheless a potent symptom of the GDR’s floundering course.

In August 1961, the building of the Berlin Wall stalled the emigration movement and opposition once more. ‘On 13 August the GDR authorities started to build a wall physically dividing East from West Berlin, ostensibly to prevent ‘spies and diversionists’ from entering their capital city but in reality to prevent the collapse of the East German economy.’[22] Nevertheless, by 1989, the wall was not only unable to mitigate problems, but it had become a major one itself. Hence the Berlin Wall is a not insignificant aspect to the collapse of the GDR, and one could assert that although the Berlin Wall temporarily diverted a crisis, this was only a short term expedient whose ‘shelf-life’ and effectiveness would indeed be limited.

Therefore I would assert, that it was the years of built-up repression and anger, released in 1989, which holds much responsibility for causing the collapse on the GDR. However, it was new freedoms over travel given by the SED in November 1989, which ‘would become the direct catalyst for the implosion of the political system.’[23] These freedoms ‘…succeeded only in bringing discontent to boiling point and therefore leaving the party leadership…with only one set of alternatives: either capitulation or the opening of the wall.’[24]

Eventually people’s anguish eroded trust in authority, and the masses were forced to find alternate means to voice dissent. This alternate culture was located in the two types of citizen movements to be mentioned below.

The emergence of domestic opposition thus holds what I would deem a large share of the responsibility for the collapse of the GDR, as ‘The combined impact of exit and voice finally brought the regime down.’[25]

Firstly, the environmental, peace and anti-weapons movements proliferated, organised by the church and led by intellectuals. The 1980s thus saw the emergence of a serious, strong, principled opposition that united with popular mass discontent to bring down the GDR. More and more people sympathised with reformers’ demands, particularly since censorship and subjugation continued, despite appealing rhetoric from the East. Some political activity, directly challenged the division of Europe, for instance, ‘The Initiative for Peace and Human Rights’ (IFM), who’s publishing of ‘Grenzfall’ demanded unification through demilitarisation and peace. Such movements, ‘proved to be the backbone of the “revolution” in the former GDR.’[26]

Secondly, the emigration movement boomed as many protested by “voting with their feet”. Instead of voicing their anger and opposition verbally, they fled into Western Germany as a visible sign of their resentments. This had serious economic ramifications, as those who fled were mainly young, skilled and educated workers, and this worsened the labour shortage. The situation was worsened by the opening of the Hungarian borders, and in this respect, ‘…Helmut, Kohl and Genscher took the initiative and can be credited with decisive action contributing to the collapse of the GDR.’[27] Opposition became increasingly determined and demanding as they grew in size and strength and as the government faltered, delivering meagre reforms. Opposition movements ‘undermined the cultural hegemony of the SED by the introduction of new and competing values and the reinterpretation of party principles.’[28]

However, what caused this discontent and resulting unrest? Aside from the aforementioned political repression, ‘standards of living stagnated and popular discontent increased.’[29] Therefore grievances over poverty, food shortages, poor housing conditions, lack of consumer goods and the fact that the best products were exported were prevalent, and the very fact that the GDR was failing in its social aspects also lessened trust and confidence in socialism. The desire for peace, travel and human rights, and opposition to nuclear weapons and military service, additionally created the necessary preconditions for civil revolution. Moreover, ‘The continued reductions in those permitted to enter universities, the lack of upward mobility, and the selective use of material privileges…furthered feelings of depravation and disillusionment.’[30] The Berlin wall was also highly psychologically damaging, in its visual presence, and what it stood for – especially the forbidden freedom of movement. All this upset accumulated over time, and worsened when details of prosperous conditions in the West became known, as the GDR could compare itself and realise its deficiencies. ‘While the GDR made economic progress…it was clear to East Germans that the West of the country offered greater wealth, freedom, more consumer goods and wages with more purchasing power.’[31] Thus increased communications between ordinary people in East and West during the 1970s and 80s hastened the collapse. The opening of Intershops with West German goods not only contributed to everyday frustration as East Germans lacked acceptable currency to purchase the goods on offer, but also opened them further to the affluence of the West, and led them to question their poverty, and the entire basis of their own regime.

Diametrically opposed to the argument that ‘Gorbachev was entirely responsible for the collapse of the GDR’, is the suggestion of the inevitability of collapse. Though one must remember that collapse was unexpected, Maier’s suggestion that unification, a natural successor of collapse, was always on the cards, must also be considered. ‘Soviet policy at the Potsdam Conference envisaged the eventual re-emergence of a unified but hopefully compliant Germany’[32] and consequently had the intention for it to happen all along. ‘The constitution, which was not ratified by popular vote, was designed to be compatible with that of the Federal Republic, providing the basis for possible future reunification.’[33] ‘Most western commentators would have countered that the switches were set wrong from the moment central planning was imposed in post war Eastern Europe’[34], and argued that socialism was impossible given the globalising setting of the 1980s, as it lacked the necessary purchasing power to break into the West.

In determining the relative importance of internal and external factors in effecting the collapse of the GDR, one has established that Gorbachev was not ‘entirely responsible’. The preliminary statement is accurate to the extent that Gorbachev facilitated the collapse. A response to financial necessity, and the changing international order (specifically the conclusion of the Cold War), led to Gorbachev liberating Eastern Europe, and ‘opening up’ the USSR itself. These actions, I would contend, triggered a proliferation of thought, and with it political dissent in the GDR, which led to mass civil activism and collapse. One can thus logically affirm that ‘…Soviet power was critical for the regime’[35], even if it was not exclusively responsible for its fall.

 

 

I would similarly categorize the events of Eastern Europe as activating, rather than causing collapse. The opening of Hungary’s border on September 11th was one such catalyst, and as Welsh examines, ‘…It was the decision by the Hungarian government to dismantle the border fortifications to the West…that set in motion unprecedented and unexpected developments’[36]. Meanwhile East Euopean revolutions,, ‘…inaugurating the whole process of revolutionary change in eastern Europe.’[37]

I would however argue, that it was the overriding drive of internal developments that one should more readily highlight as long term causes, as ‘Communist rule slowly floundered under the weight of economic decline and popular dissatisfaction’[38]. Indeed, popular discontent over repression and living standards, sustained by economic weakness brought about the collapse of the GDR, through the proliferation of civil opposition. Coinciding with the context of East European rebellion, it was a fateful combination with unavoidable consequences. A certain amount of blame can undoubtedly be apportioned to the failures of the SED leadership, who underestimated popular fervour and refused change. Such mismanagement, coupled with ‘structural defects’[39], clarifies why the GDR so readily collapsed in 1989. ‘While the effective challenge posed to the Communist regime in 1989 was in large measure only made possible by the radical changes in the Soviet Union and its European and global policies, the character of the ‘gentle revolution’ was crucially shaped by the ways in which movements for reform had been developing in the preceding decade.’[40]

‘A more satisfactory explanation for the events of 1989 can be developed from the observation that domestic and international politics are inseparably intertwined.’[41] Therefore, one can thus conclude that it was internal developments with an external influence, which brought about the collapse of East Germany in 1989. It was ultimately an interplay of a plethora of factors which effected the end of the GDR. Internal weakness and opposition (through ‘exit and ‘voice’) provided the necessary preconditions, whilst it took actions from above in the form of Gorbachev, to provoke underlying economic difficulties and bring the GDR regime crashing down.

 

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

Carr, William, A History of Germany, 1815-1990, (London, 1991).

 

Childs, David, The Fall of the GDR, (London, 2001)

 

Evans, Richard, J., Rereading German History, 1800-1996, From Unification to Reunification, (London, 1997).

 

Fulbrook, Mary, The Fontana History of Germany 1918 – 1990, (London, 1991).

 

Glaessner, Gert-Joachim, The Unification Process in Germany, From Dictatorship to Democracy, (London, 1992).

 

Hancock, M. Donald & Welsh, Helga, A., (eds), German Unification: Process and Outcomes, (Oxford, 1994).

 

Hirschman, Albert, O., ‘Exit, Voice, and the Fate of the German Democratic Republic: An Essay in Conceptual History’, World Politics, 45, (1993), pp. 173 – 202

 

Hobsbawm, E.J., The Age of Extremes, (London, 1994).

 

Lohmann, Suzanne, ‘The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989 – 1991’, World Politics, 47, (1994), pp. 42 – 101.

 

Maier, Charles, S., Dissolution: The Crisis of Communism and the End of East Germany, (Chichester, 1997).

 

Merriman, John, A History of Modern Europe, (London, 1996).

 

Overy, Richard, The Times, History of the World, (????).

 

Pond, Elizabeth, ‘A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR’, International Security, Volume 15, No 2, (Autumn 1990), pp. 35 – 66.

 

Thomaneck, J.K.A., & Niven, Bill, Dividing and Uniting Germany, (London, 2001).

 

 

 

[1] Gert-Joachim, Glaessner, The Unification Process in Germany, From Dictatorship to Democracy, (London, 1992), p. 34.

[2] J.K.A. Thomaneck & Bill Niven, Dividing and Uniting Germany, (London, 2001), p. 57.

[3] Suzanne Lohmann, ‘The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989 – 1991’, World Politics, 47, (1994), p. 44.

[4] Charles S. Maier, Dissolution, (Chichester, 1997), p. 53.

[5] Richard J. Evans, Rereading German History, 1800-1996, From Unification to Reunification, (London, 1997), p. 213

[6] Gert-Joachim, Glaessner, The Unification Process in Germany, From Dictatorship to Democracy, (London, 1992), p. 26.

[7] E.J., Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, (London, 1994), p. 489.

[8] Elizabeth Pond, ‘A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR’, International Security, 15, (1990), p. 37.

[9] M. Fulbrook, The Fontana History of Germany 1918 – 1990, (London, 1991), p. 323.

[10] Elizabeth Pond, ‘A Wall Destroyed: The Dynamics of German Unification in the GDR’, International Security, 15, (1990), p. 41

[11] William Carr, A History of Germany, 1815-1990, (London, 1991), p. 378.

[12] M. Fulbrook, The Fontana History of Germany 1918 – 1990, (London, 1991), p. 204.

[13] E.J., Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, (London, 1994), p. 474.

[14] Charles S. Maier, Dissolution, (Chichester, 1997), p. 59.

[15] Charles S. Maier, Dissolution, (Chichester, 1997), p. 79.

[16] M. Fulbrook, The Fontana History of Germany 1918 – 1990, (London, 1991), p. 174.

[17] Charles S. Maier, Dissolution, (Chichester, 1997), p. 16.

[18] M. Fulbrook, The Fontana History of Germany 1918 – 1990, (London, 1991), p. 188.

[19] E.J., Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, (London, 1994), p. 495.

[20] Johannes L. Kruppe, ‘West-German Policy Toward East Germany: A Motor of Unification?’ in M. Donald Hancock & Helga Welsh (eds), German Unification: Process and Outcomes, (Oxford 1994), p. 47

[21] David Childs, The Fall of the GDR, (London, 2001), p. 12.

[22] William Carr, A History of Germany, 1815-1990, (London, 1991), p. 380.

[23] Gert-Joachim, Glaessner, The Unification Process in Germany, From Dictatorship to Democracy, (London, 1992), p. 14.

[24] Gert-Joachim, Glaessner, The Unification Process in Germany, From Dictatorship to Democracy, (London, 1992), p. 14.

[25] Michaela W, Richter, ‘Exiting the GDR: Political Movements and Parties Between Democratization and Westernization’, in M. Donald Hancock & Helga Welsh (eds), German Unification: Process and Outcomes, (Oxford 1994), p. 99

[26] Helga A. Welsh, ‘The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the GDR: Evolution, Revolution and Diffusion’, in M. Donald Hancock & Helga Welsh (eds), German Unification: Process and Outcomes, (Oxford 1994), p. 29.

[27] J.K.A. Thomaneck & Bill Niven, Dividing and Uniting Germany, (London, 2001), p. 62.

[28] Gert-Joachim, Glaessner, The Unification Process in Germany, From Dictatorship to Democracy, (London, 1992), p. 68

[29] Suzanne Lohmann, ‘The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989 – 1991’, World Politics, 47, (1994), p. 59.

[30] Helga A. Welsh, ‘The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the GDR: Evolution, Revolution and Diffusion’, in M. Donald Hancock & Helga Welsh (eds), German Unification: Process and Outcomes, (Oxford 1994), p. 25.

[31] J.K.A. Thomaneck & Bill Niven, Dividing and Uniting Germany, (London, 2001), p. 42.

[32] Charles S. Maier, Dissolution, (Chichester, 1997), p. 8.

[33] M. Fulbrook, The Fontana History of Germany 1918 – 1990, (London, 1991), p. 171.

[34] Charles S. Maier, Dissolution, (Chichester, 1997), p. 60

[35] Charles S. Maier, Dissolution, (Chichester, 1997), p. 52

[36] Helga A. Welsh, ‘The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe and the GDR: Evolution, Revolution and Diffusion’, in M. Donald Hancock & Helga Welsh (eds), German Unification: Process and Outcomes, (Oxford 1994), p. 18.

[37] M. Fulbrook, The Fontana History of Germany 1918 – 1990, (London, 1991), p. 323.

[38] John Merriman, A History Of Modern Europe, (London, 1996), p. 1383.

[39] Gert-Joachim, Glaessner, The Unification Process in Germany, From Dictatorship to Democracy, (London, 1992), p. 35.

[40] M. Fulbrook, The Fontana History of Germany 1918 – 1990, (London, 1991), p. 266.

[41] Michael G. Huelshoff & Arthur M. Hanhardt Jr., ‘Step Towards Union: The Collapse of the GDR and the Unification of Germany’, in M. Donald Hancock & Helga Welsh (eds), German Unification: Process and Outcomes, (Oxford 1994), p. 74.

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